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THOUGHT, JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION*
Hans-Johann GLOCK
Universität Zürich
Denke nie, gedacht zu haben! Wenn Du denkst Du denkst, 
dann denkst Du nur Du denkst. Denn das Denken der 
Gedanken, ist gedankenloses Denken. (Never think you 
think. If you think you think, you only think you think. Th ink-
ing thought is thoughtless thinking.)
             Chess players’ tongue twister
In 2009 Reinhard Brandt published his book Können Tiere Denken? (Can animals 
think?). Quite rightly this work has played a leading role in recent discussions 
of the issue in German-speaking countries.1 Two years earlier I had given my 
inaugural lecture at the University of Zurich with exactly the same title. In that 
lecture, however, and in some other publications, I have reached conclusions 
that in many—though not in all—respects run counter to those of Brandt. 
Concerning the question of the intellectual diff erence between human and non-
human animals (the latter henceforth referred to simply as ‘animals’), Brandt 
takes a moderate to emphatically diff erentialist line, whereas I am a moderate 
assimilationist. In particular I would argue that living beings without language 
are—at least in principle—capable of certain forms of thought.
However, despite the fact that I undoubtedly have my own opinions on many 
aspects of this topic, I shall in the following pages concern myself primarily with 
Brandt’s book. In doing so I shall endeavour to take as my example Quine’s 
disclaimer in his review of Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Th eory, namely that 
his purpose was not “to invoke [his own] philosophy in criticism of another 
man’s book” (Quine 1953, 435). Nevertheless, for reasons of brevity I shall be 
compelled on occasion to refer to works of my own.
Taking Brandt’s project as my starting point, I shall fi rst discuss some meth-
odological issues that arise from his appeal to Morgan’s Canon, and then address 
his conception of thought as judgment. Th is involves a critique of his argument 
 Th is text is a translation by Joseph Swann of my original paper “Denken, Urteilen, 
Wahrnehmen”.
1. Unless otherwise noted, all page references are to this work.
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that the concept of thought should be restricted to judgment, and an exposition of 
the contrary thesis, namely that thinking involves more than judging. Th e next 
section will concentrate on the aspect of thinking that comes closest to Brandt’s 
position, namely ‘thinking that such and such is the case’, or belief. Brandt dis-
putes that animals are capable of belief. I disagree with his theses on this matter, 
which closely parallel Davidson’s notoriously well-known arguments, and adduce 
two reasons in support of the opposite view, namely that animals possess knowl-
edge and perception, and therefore also belief. Finally I shall consider Brandt’s 
exposition of the relation between perception, diff erentiation and comparison. 
I shall attempt to show that his often behaviouristic conception of animal per-
ception is both tactically and strategically at odds with his well-founded admis-
sion at other moments that some animals can make distinctions, and that their 
behaviour cannot be reduced to simple stimulus-response mechanisms.
1. Brandt’s project
Th e question of the intellectual capacities of animals has for some time played 
a signifi cant role in the English and French philosophical traditions. Th at it has 
now also come to the fore among German-speaking philosophers is above all 
thanks to the work of Perler, Wild (Perler, Wild 2005, Wild 2008) and Brandt. 
Th e fundamental issue in the present discussion is: ‘Do at least some animals 
possess intelligence comparable with that of humans?’ Brandt’s book, however, 
starts from a somewhat more specifi c question: ‘Can animals think?’
Th e answer to both questions is not just a matter of empirical observation, 
whether in the fi eld or the laboratory, nor simply of biological theory, but also 
of how one understands disputed concepts like intelligence and thought. Both 
in general and at a more concrete level there is a fundamental diff erence here 
between two approaches. In the matter of mental capacities diff erentialists see 
signifi cant qualitative (categoric) diff erences between animals and humans. 
Assimilationists, on the other hand, maintain that even these diff erences are purely 
quantitative: they see the relation between the intelligence of humans and of the 
higher animals as one of continuity.
Brandt represents a by and large moderate diff erentialism whose historical 
roots lie with Aristotle and Kant. He maintains that
•  the psyche or soul is the seat of the ability to feel and perceive
•  it is common to animals and humans (11–20)
•   the intellect—and with it the ability to think—is a higher mental capacity 
proper to humans alone
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•   animals can ‘ostensibly not think’, which constitutes a ‘gap between the 
human and the animal’ (63) 
•   we can predicate of animals at most an analogon rationis, whose form and 
limits, however, we cannot determine (10).
2. Methodological issues
Brandt’s agnostic caveats arise among other things from the fact that it is experi-
mentally impossible to preclude the possession by animals of the brain structures 
required for thought (119). He confronts the overstated theses of many neuro-
scientists and philosophers with justifi ed scepticism, observing quite rightly that 
the subject of psychological activity is not the brain alone but the whole animal 
or human being (14-15). Yet at this point he too seems to assign to neurophysi-
ology an exaggerated importance.
Th e question whether animals can think etc. is not a matter of determin-
ing whether they possess ‘those parts of the brain that are activated in human 
thinking’ (11), but of determining what they do and what they perceive. Th e 
concepts we use at an everyday level, as well as in the behavioural sciences, are 
concerned not with genetic or neurological diff erences but with behavioural and 
perceptual abilities—i.e. phenomena in which we humans are interested in both 
our ordinary and scientifi c lives. It goes without saying that the use of such well-
established concepts is not governed by inaccessible genetic or neurophysiological 
criteria, but by those of ordinary human intercourse—which means criteria that 
are at least in principle determinable through outward (i.e. publicly accessible) 
observation and experiment.
Th us we establish fi rst of all whether a creature, for example, reacts to injury, 
perceives its surroundings, can use and make tools, recognizes itself in a mirror 
etc. Only then do we start investigating the neurophysiological structures and 
processes that might underlie such abilities. Th e causal explanation of men-
tal qualities immediately involves the brain—and one step further back the 
genome—but the prior question whether mental capacities exist at all is another 
matter. Th e neurophysiological arguments of the assimilationists would be base-
less in a world where the behaviour (including gestures and facial expression) of 
animals provided no evidence whatsoever of any criteria (e.g. intelligent plan-
ning) for the ascription of what we mean by mental capacity; or alternatively in 
a world that did provide such evidence, but in which the criteria were clearly not 
fulfi lled. In the latter case one would have to conclude that the neurophysiologi-
cal phenomena associated in humans with intelligent planning are not associated 
with analogous phenomena in animals—a conclusion that might be reinforced 
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by the observation that these phenomena belong contextually to central nervous 
systems that on the whole diff er widely from those of humans.
Conversely, diff erentialist answers to Brandt’s initial question are not imme-
diately refuted by the evidence (whether evolutionary, genetic or neurophysi-
ological) for biological continuity between animals and humans. Small genetic or 
neurophysiological diff erences may lead to major diff erences in mental capacity. 
Nor does evolutionary continuity imply that currently existing species share our 
mental abilities.
Despite the neurophysiologically motivated agnosticism mentioned above, 
Brandt’s diff erentialism is by and large based on philosophical arguments 
independent of any agnosticism. He maintains for conceptual reasons that 
the ability to think is bound indissolubly to language. Only those creatures 
can form a judgment that are capable in principle of articulating that judg-
ment in language—a position I have called ‘lingualism’, and one that in rela-
tion to the question ‘Can animals think?’ gives rise to more problems than it 
solves. Do some animals possess linguistic abilities? If so, what sort of abilities 
are they, and what implications do they have for the intellectual capacities of
these animals? 
Unfortunately Brandt does not give this matter the rigorous attention it 
deserves. He simply denies the linguistic ability of parrots (31, 35), as if Pep-
perberg’s (2009) Alex studies had never taken place. Th is is a shame, since his 
linking of thought with judgment gives rise to an extremely interesting question 
that has so far been neglected in animal language research, namely what sort 
of affi  rmation and negation is contained in the symbolic systems acquired by 
acculturated primates, marine mammals and parrots. Brandt denies outright 
the possibility of negation in animal language (57f., cf. also 81f., 135-6)—a 
position that at least calls for substantiation if one considers that Yerkish, an 
artifi cial language learnt by primates, contains signs for affi  rmation and nega-
tion, albeit with reference to a whole sentence, and that marine mammals can 
operate so-called ‘Yes and No paddles’ (Hermann, Forestell 1985, 667–91;
Pepperberg 2000, 83).2
A fi nal methodological point before turning to the core theses of Brandt’s 
book is his recourse to the principle of economy. Brandt concedes to the assimi-
lationists that the explanation of animal behaviour through an appeal to ‘think-
ing activity’ is ‘pragmatically convincing, […] practised with success, and […] 
empirically irrefutable’ (62); but at the same time he places the burden of proof 
fi rmly in his opponents’ camp. For, in line with the principle of economy in 
general and Morgan’s canon (a golden rule of comparative behavioural studies) 
2. On the question whether judgments require internal negation cf. Gerson Reuter’s article 
in the present volume.
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in particular, mental attributes may only be predicated of animals if it is the only 
possible explanation of their behaviour (71, 76, 93).
But the golden rule to be applied in this case is not so much the principle of 
economy as that of plausibility. Th e value of parsimony must be weighed against 
that of other methodological principles such as explanatory power, simplicity, 
precision, practicability etc. (cf. Glock 2009, 236). Th e assumption that purpose-
ful intelligent behaviour can be explained in animals, as in humans, by an appeal 
to beliefs, wishes, intentions and the like is at all events preferable to the—in 
Brandt’s own words ‘somewhat unhappy’ (122)—postulate of an undetermined 
and perhaps indeterminable analogon rationis. Nor is simple associative learn-
ing an acceptable ready-made option for the diff erentialist seeking to explain 
intelligent behaviour. On the contrary, it must be demonstrated in the concrete 
instance that parsimonious explanations of this kind are actually more plausible 
than alternatives involving more complex cognitive performances. Th ese latter 
are at all events preferable in cases where there is no evidence of any opportunity 
for associative learning on the part of the subject.
Finally it is worth noting in this context that the law of parsimony is a two-
edged sword. It can also be invoked in support of a unifi ed explanation of analo-
gous behaviour in humans and animals. And in one respect Brandt does precisely 
this, when he appeals to the principle of economy to postulate an assimilationist 
explanation of the human and animal faculty of spatial orientation (cf. his essay 
in this volume). But a methodology that is good in the one case must also be 
good in the other—with regard to the faculty of discrimination, planning, or 
the production and use of tools etc. Of course these activities present diffi  culties 
of their own, above all the question whether they are really analogous in humans 
and animals. But economy or simplicity of explanation does not per se constitute 
an argument for diff erentialism.
3. Brandt’s concept of thought as judgment
Brandt proposes a concept of thinking that equates it with the activity of judg-
ing. He sees thought as “a mental capacity to form judgments that we only 
know with certainty to exist in humans”. What counts here is “only those 
mental acts [that] reveal the structure of affi  rmation or negation: ‘S is P, S is not
P’” (9, 29f.).
Th is concept of judgment, however, is open to objection, a fact of which 
Brandt is fully aware and which he tackles with a rhetorical question: Does this 
defi nition not beg the question whether animals can think? Putting this in more 
general terms one can ask: Doesn’t the equation of thought with judgment bypass 
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entirely the normal concept of thinking and with it the normal understanding 
of Brandt’s opening question?
Brandt believes he can show that to equate thought with judgment is not a 
mere stipulation, nor does it beg the question. In order to safeguard his position 
he adduces a classically elenctic argument:
We seek to introduce a uniform (and not specifi cally biological, philosophi-
cal, or computer technical) concept of thought by basing our argument on 
the thinking and judgment that is employed by everyone who speaks about 
thinking. And this is the very same activity of thinking that is performed 
when our thesis is disputed: in other words the opponent is immediately 
caught in self-contradiction. (29)
But this argument is based on an equivocation with respect to the phrase “think-
ing […] that is employed by everyone who speaks about thinking”. What is 
it exactly that Brandt sees as an insuperable obstacle for the opponents of his 
concept of thought as judgment?
•   Either it is a matter of the concept of thought ordinary people use when 
they talk about thinking;
•   or it is a matter of the type of thought ordinary people perform when they 
talk about thinking.
Let us take the fi rst option fi rst: the ordinary concept of thought. Th is concept 
expresses an understanding of thought that can be abandoned in favour of 
another concept without self-contradiction. But it is a concept that can and 
should at least constitute the starting point of a conceptual investigation. Th is 
ordinary, well-established concept of thought is, however, not identical with the 
concept of judgment. I shall develop this point further in section IV.
Th e second option immediately involves us in thinking about thinking. Here 
thought may very well be equivalent to judgment and the use of concepts; for 
to talk about thinking is to use concepts and to perform an act of judgment in 
both the logical and ordinary sense of forming a considered utterance. But such 
meta-thinkers do not incur self-contradiction if they do not themselves identify 
thought with judgment.
Th ere is no contradiction in employing a concept of thought when one is talk-
ing about thinking that does not apply solely to the particular type of thinking 
one is at that moment performing. Nor is there any inconsistency in maintain-
ing that the concept of judgment covers thinking about thinking but does not 
cover everything that passes for thinking. No contradiction would arise even if 
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one were to employ a concept of thought that did not apply at all to the mental 
operations one was at that moment performing. Contradiction would only arise 
if one were to apply such a concept to those operations—i.e. if one were to apply 
precisely to talking and/or thinking about thinking a concept of thought that 
did not in this case apply.
Let me illustrate the problem of Brandt’s argumentation with two analogies. 
Is there a concept of happiness that necessarily underlies all discussion of that 
subject? Even if there were, it would not necessarily be restricted in its scope to 
the happiness we experience when we talk about happiness. One may of course 
object that to talk about happiness one does not have to be happy, but to talk 
about thinking one does have to think.
My second analogy avoids this dilemma: it refers to the concept of ‘speech 
act’. For to speak of a speech act is necessarily to perform a speech act. But 
does this mean that the concept of speech act one thereby uses must be such as 
to apply exclusively to the type of speech act one is at that moment perform-
ing—namely assertoric speech acts? Th at can hardly be the case, for if it were, it 
would exclude (among other things) both questions and commands, which are 
quite obviously speech acts as well.
4. Th inking—‘a widely ramifi ed concept’
Th e attempt to establish the equation of thought with judgment as an irrefutable 
and inescapable axiom for all thinking about thinking has, therefore, failed. As 
Wittgenstein so succinctly put it, ‘Th inking’ is a ‘widely ramifi ed concept’ (Z 
110). In the present context one must distinguish three forms:
•  to think of something—e.g. the cup of tea on my desk;
•   to think about a problem—e.g. with a view to drawing a theoretical or 
practical conclusion;
•  to think/believe that …
Th is last form amounts to harbouring a belief. It can be expressed in the formula 
‘a thinks/believes that p’, (or in abbreviated form ‘aTp’), where ‘a’ stands for 
the subject and ‘that p’ stands for the content of what ‘a’ thinks. (Th e common 
malpractice of referring to the subject as a thinker assimilates him or her to the 
penseur absorbed in thinking about a problem)
For Brandt it should actually be indisputable that animals can think of some-
thing, for he not only laudably emphasises the phenomenon of attention paying, 
but also quite rightly observes that animals can concentrate on things (objects, 
uncorrected proof
nicht  korr ig ier te Fahne
190
persons, tasks or qualities)—i.e. they can devote their entire attention to them 
(95f.).3 If that is the case, it follows that they can think of these things, for the 
statement ‘a is concentrating on x but a is not thinking of x’ is nonsensical.4 Th e 
only open question is what sort of animals think of what sort of things—whether 
animals can, for example, think of things beyond their immediate perceptual 
horizon.
But what about the second form of thinking? Th inking about something can 
initially at least be understood as the process that underlies intelligent problem-
solving. And intelligence is—again broadly speaking—the capacity to solve 
newly encountered problems in a fl exible and appropriate way. Th is is not, in 
humans, bound inextricably to a sequence of inner judgments.  Pace Plato, an 
inner monologue is neither necessary nor suffi  cient for thinking about some-
thing (cf. Ryle 1949, Glock 1997). Associative and image-centred thought often 
plays a decisive role in this activity, and often enough, too, there is no answer 
as to what exactly passed through one’s mind while one was thinking about the 
problem in question.
Flexible, intelligent problem-solving, however, is something of which higher 
animals are capable. Th e behaviour of primates in this respect is similar to our 
own in its procedures, as well as in the gestures and facial expressions involved. 
We may conclude, therefore, that there is no reason either to equate thinking 
with judgment or to deny it of animals.
5. Th inking that and belief
In many passages, however, Brandt modifi es his identifi cation thesis, saying, 
for instance, that judgment constitutes ‘the core of thought’ (33). Th e question 
arises, therefore, whether at least ‘thinking that’ is identical with judgment, and 
is so in a way that excludes animals.
Brandt’s argument for this position can be summarized as follows:
•  P1  All ‘thinking that’ entails judgment 
•  P2   Judgment presupposes the possession of a concept
•  P3   Animals do not possess concepts
3. But he continuously falls into a behaviourist idiom, speaking of stimuli rather than objects 
etc. For a critique of this cf. VIII Perception and Diff erentiation.
4. In the discussion at the book symposion in Frankfurt it was asserted that one can 
concentrate on something without thinking of it. Th is would seem to refer to the meditative 
fi xing of visual attention on the object in question. But either that is not a case of concentration 
on the object—because the mind is emptied—or ‘thinking of ’ is implied at some point.
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•  C1  Animals cannot form a judgment
•  C2  Animals cannot ‘think that’.
P2 is to be recommended as a terminological proposition: it makes good histori-
cal and taxonomic sense to restrict the concept of judgment to those judgments 
that involve concepts. But if one accepts this terminology, at least one of the 
premises P1 or P3 is false. For this reason the argument is invalid. Furthermore, 
conclusion C1 is in fact false, and so is C2. In what follows I shall attempt to 
show why (cf. also Glock 2009).
With C2 Brandt accedes to Aristotle’s and Davidson’s denial that animals can 
possess beliefs or opinions, for each of these mental states entails articulation in 
the form of a judgment (e.g. 91). Despite his illustrious predecessors, Brandt’s 
thesis is, however, open to objection. It implies that Malcolm’s by now famous 
dog does not (falsely) think that the cat is in the tree up which he is assiduously 
barking, nor does the chimpanzee think that the M&Ms are in the container 
she has opted for in a forced choice test etc. etc.
Brandt nevertheless considers C2 to be unproblematic:
Can animals be convinced of something, can they believe it without knowing 
it precisely? Th at can only be the case if they can recognize the distinctions 
between these states, which is hardly likely. (46)
Th is latter assertion is challenged by some assimilationists who, on the basis of 
wager game experiments with apes, maintain that these animals possess a degree 
of self-referential meta-cognition (Kornell et. al. 2007, cf. also Esken 2012). My 
own inclination is to agree with Brandt in this matter. But this does not alter 
the fact that his argument—like Davidson’s parallel claims—is a non-sequitur. It 
does not follow from the fact that a does not recognize the distinction between 
F and G that a cannot be F or G. Th us a is not invulnerable to a malignant 
tumour simply because a does not know the diff erence between malignant and 
benign tumours. 
In the matter of knowledge versus belief—or of true versus false beliefs—one 
can, of course, à la Davidson, attempt to show that there are special reasons why 
such knowledge or truth can only be predicated of a if a can make the distinc-
tion in question and is in possession of the corresponding concepts. Brandt, too, 
seems to rely implicitly on an argument of this kind, as he repeatedly denies 
that animals can have mental states that are true or false, or in other words that 
they can be wrong ( 71, 81, 89, 115). But, as far as I can see, he stops short of 
arguing the case explicitly; so I will briefl y outline Davidson’s position, which 
may be taken to fi ll the gap. 
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Davidson’s argument runs as follows:
i.  aTp  a can be wrong in thinking that p
ii.  aTp  a can realize that a is wrong in thinking that p
iii.  aTp  a possesses the concept of error
iv.  aTp  a possesses the concept of (erroneous) belief
If one accepts that the animal meta-cognition mentioned above is not only real 
but also conceptual in nature, one will be able to accept (iv) without being bound 
to either C1 or C2. But a more plausible position would be to challenge (iii) by 
regarding the self-referential meta-cognition as non-conceptual. Independently 
of the assumption of meta-cognition, however, (ii) is already misleading inas-
much as it posits second order beliefs. a can manifest error by showing signs of 
surprise or disappointment, or by an alteration in behaviour, and a mere change 
of belief can lead a from the false belief ‘that p’ to the true belief ‘that not p’ 
(for a more detailed version of this critique of Davidson see Glock 2000, 54-6).
6. Belief and knowledge
So far I have confi ned myself to refuting Brandt’s objections against the posses-
sion by animals of the ability to think that. But there are also two positive reasons 
for thinking that animals have beliefs.
Th e fi rst follows from the connection between belief and knowledge. Animals 
are capable of knowledge-that, a proposition which Brandt—contra Davidson—
expressly accepts. Like us, dogs know “they cannot walk on water” (7). But in 
order to know something, a subject must have appropriate beliefs. Knowledge 
and belief go hand in hand; or to put it more precisely, the concept of belief 
must be available as a fallback position to characterize the epistemic situation 
of a subject who exercises cognitive faculties but without attaining knowledge. 
Even if knowledge does not in every case involve belief (pace its traditional 
equation with true and justifi ed belief ), the ability to know presupposes the abil-
ity to believe. Th ere is nothing sensational about this statement. Like humans, 
animals can err. Assuming the appropriate wishes and intentions, this manifests 
itself above all in situations where an animal’s behaviour shows it to be led by its 
senses but in an inappropriate way. Th e possibility and circumstances of animal 
error have, in fact, been just as richly documented in ethological observations 
and experiments as the possibility and circumstances of animal knowledge.
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7. Conviction and perception
A second argument for the possibility that animals possess beliefs is closely allied 
to the fi rst. It is based on the most fundamental and important of all cogni-
tive abilities, that of perception. Animals can perceive their physical and social 
environment in many diff erent ways. It is important for my argument that such 
perception is not confi ned to objects or persons; that is to say it takes not only 
the form ‘A perceives X ’, where X is a snake or shotgun report etc., but also the 
form ‘A perceives that p’. 
Th is conclusion derives from the connection between perception and behav-
iour. Complex animal behaviour cannot be explained merely in terms of the 
perception of objects; it entails the perception of facts and contexts. Take, for 
example, the dog that has learnt not to take his bone when this is lying on 
the table but only when it is lying in his bowl. Th e dog’s behaviour cannot 
be explained simply in terms of his perceiving discrete objects. It can only be 
explained in terms of the following opposition:
•  the dog sees at time t1 that bone is on table
•  the dog sees at time t2 that bone is in bowl.
Why? Because at both t1 and t2 the dog can see the bone, table and bowl. So 
perception of the conglomeration formed by these three objects cannot explain 
the diff erence in its behaviour at t1 and t2.
But, it might be objected, this behaviour can be explained behaviouristically. 
We only need to posit the following contrast
•  stimulus: ‘bone on the table’—reaction: ‘do not take’
•  stimulus: ‘bone in the bowl’—reaction: ‘take’.
But what sort of stimulus is this? Is it purely proximal and physiological, like 
the pain stimulus to which even an oyster will react? Th is behaviouristic fairytale 
ignores the distinction between lower animals and higher ones like dogs, dolphins 
or primates, which possess a range of diff erent sense organs and corresponding 
sensory centres in the brain. And primates at least score well in the standard 
tests for object permanence and object identifi cation in line with Piaget (Seed, 
Tomasello 2010, 409).
Th e alternative is to admit that the reaction in question is not just to a proxi-
mal stimulus but to perceived information. But how can this information be 
specifi ed if not as a perceived fact? An apparent way out of this dilemma for the 
diff erentialists might be as follows: what the dog perceives is not that the bone is 
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on the table or in the bowl; what he perceives is ‘bone on table’ or ‘bone in bowl’. 
But this is not really a way out. For either the determinants ‘on the table’ and 
‘in the bowl’ are used restrictively, to indicate which bone the dog perceives—but 
this would not explain the divergent behaviour of the dog, which perceives the 
same bone at t1 and t2. Or, alternatively, they are used as ellipses for ‘lying on 
the table’ and ‘lying in the bowl’, which would explain the divergent behaviour 
of the dog. But to perceive the bone as lying in the bowl is simply to perceive 
that the bone is lying in the bowl by another name. One way or another the 
dog’s behaviour can only be explained on the hypothesis of factual perception, 
perception that.
Having established this, I come now to the second step in my argument, 
which pays due deference to the English phrase seeing is believing:
From the proposition ‘a sees that p’ (the sun is shining etc.) we may conclude 
either ‘a knows that p’ (where ‘seeing’ is used factively) or ‘a believes that p’ 
(where it is used non-factively). But both ‘knowing that p’ and ‘believing that 
p’ are cases of ‘thinking that p’ in the sense that is relevant here. It follows that 
Brandt’s initial P2 is false. Th is confronts him with a dilemma. For
•   either all beings able to ‘perceive that’ are also able to form judgments and 
concepts, in which case P3 is false, for all of these animals will then possess 
concepts (albeit not our concepts)
•   or P1 is false, because ‘thinking that’ (i.e. holding a belief ) is possible 
without either a judgment or concept.
I would plead for the abandonment of P3, but that is another story, told in 
another article (Glock 2010).
8. Perception and diff erentiation
Brandt is in many respects a moderate diff erentialist, not least, for example, 
in the restrained and sensitive way in which he addresses the issue of animal 
consciousness. Here he provides a positive antidote to the widespread hysteria 
that, especially in the English-speaking world, appears to greet the treatment 
of so-called qualia (cf. Glock 2011). Th at animals are endowed with sentience 
and sense perception, and that higher animals are, through their senses, aware 
of their physical and social environment should really be uncontroversial. Yet it 
is challenged by a style of thought that takes consciousness to be not so much 
a mental capacity as a mysterious inner glow beyond the reach of any evidence 
concerning either language or behaviour.
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On the other hand, so far as the distinction between sense perception and 
thought, and in particular sense perception and judgment is concerned, Brandt 
at least in one respect goes even further than the radical diff erentialists. For in 
contrast to these—even to Davidson—he at times denies animals the ability 
not only of conceptual classifi cation or categorization but also of diff erentiation 
(66, 71f., 81). 
Such denial is prima facie paradoxical, or at least highly implausible, for it 
is based in Brandt’s text in the fi rst instance on the equation of diff erentiation 
with explicit judgments of comparison (69-70). Th is, however, is an unjustifi ed 
intellectualization. For diff erentiation does not require any sort of monologue, 
either exterior or interior, but only the ability to perceive that object x is F and 
object y is not F, or that x is F and y is G. It does not even require that an F be 
perceived as F. Th at animals possess the ability to make distinctions of this sort 
is not only obvious to the common-sense observer; it has been thoroughly dem-
onstrated in many scientifi c investigations and experiments. Animals have shown 
themselves able, both in the laboratory and in the wild, to distinguish many 
diff erent colours, fl avours, sounds, forms, materials, quantities, other creatures 
etc. Moreover, many of these abilities are not innate but learnt. (Tomasello, Call 
2010, cap. 4–5; Herrnstein, Loveland, Cable 1976, 285–302)
However, there is another, less immediate reason for Brandt’s denial that ani-
mals are able to diff erentiate. Th is is evident at certain points where he reveals 
a markedly reductionist attitude to animal perception, which he assimilates 
not only to sensation but to the mechanical reactions of bicycles and compass 
needles (67, 71, 116f.). Against such reductionism it is important to distinguish 
between the following:
•  diff erential reactions of inanimate objects to external causal infl uences
•   diff erential reactions of animate but non-sensient organisms in order to 
meet their needs
•   mental but non-cognitive reactions like that of an oyster to a noxious 
stimulus
•   diff erentiation or discrimination based on perception, as found in higher 
animals with refi ned sense organs
•  classifi cation based on conceptualization.
Brandt’s Aristotelian heritage should be reason enough for him to accept such 
a hierarchy. But instead of doing so he once again defends his—in this instance 
behaviouristically tinged—diff erentialism with an argument from economy. Th e 
example he takes is that of the butterfl y that seems to diff erentiate between red 
and green because it reacts diff erently to these two colours. But why, Brandt 
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asks, should this not simply be a case of a ‘single colour signal’ acting purely 
mechanically on the insect (72)? My answer is, because the butterfl y can see vari-
ous diff erent colours at the same time (we know this not only from its behaviour 
but also from the neurophysiology of its optical apparatus) and can react diff er-
ently to these colour diff erences—in accordance with the information provided 
by its sense organs. Higher animals—again in accordance with the information 
transmitted by their various (and variously refi ned) senses and the knowledge 
these provide of other relevant environmental aspects—can react with diff eren-
tial behaviour in one situation to the diff erence between red and green, while 
disregarding that diff erence in another situation.
Intelligent mammals and birds display complex behaviours that are relatively 
independent of stimuli of any sort. Far from always reacting automatically or 
mechanically in the same way to the same stimulus, they act purposefully to 
achieve a specifi c goal and can modify their behaviour in complex and fl exible 
ways that depend on the goal and on their sense perceptions. In this respect 
highly intelligent animals may even reveal something that approaches refl ection 
or planning (cf. Glock 2005, 179–82; 2009, 2457–50???).
Th is last assumption might seem to go too far in the direction of assimilation-
ism. Nevertheless we can at least note that there is no reason to suppose that 
animals live in a world of proximal neural stimuli that is ontologically diff erent 
from our perceived world of distal objects. Th e counter-assumption leads in 
Brandt’s book to inconsistencies and tensions at both the tactical and strategic 
level.
Tactically, it is striking that Brandt is unable to maintain his denial that 
animals can diff erentiate. Th us he concedes them the ability to “distinguish 
between stationary and moving objects” (73, cf. also 65); and he concedes them 
‘individual identifi cation’—i.e. the ability to diff erentiate between individual 
things or organisms (107). Finally he admits that they are capable of attention 
and concentration and can ‘select’ specifi c stimuli (95ff .). How any of this can 
be the case without the ability to distinguish between specifi c objects or qualities 
remains a mystery to me.
As to the strategic level, I would fi rst point out that it is not necessary to 
deny animals the ability to diff erentiate in order to question their ability to think 
in the sense of making conceptual judgments. Speaking more generally, in the 
third part of his book Brandt continuously counters assimilationist assertions 
by reducing animal behaviour to mechanical patterns of stimulus and response, 
thereby annulling the broadly Aristotelian distinction between mentally gifted 
animals and mere mechanisms that marks the fi rst part of the book. We would 
be well advised, I think, to forego this reductionism and hold Brandt to his 
concession of genuinely mental phenomena in animals.
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